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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
§§ 78A-3-102(3)G) and 78A-4-103(2)0'). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT TRACY'S 
STATUS AS A BENEFICIARY OF THE TRUST WAS NOT 
TERMINATED? 
Standard of Review 
Since the facts are not disputed, the issue of whether Tracy's Waiver and 
Assignment substantially complied with Utah's Disclaimer Statute is a question of 
statutory interpretation and therefore constitutes a question of law for which "no 
deference need be given the trial court's conclusions." Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 
2008 UT App 113, If 4, 182 P.3d 924. With respect to the issue of whether Tracy waived 
his beneficial interest in the Trust, "[w]hether a party has effected a waiver is a mixed 
question of law and fact." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain 
Fonds, 2006 UT 35, \ 21, 140 P.3d 1200. Finally, whether the Trust was modified by 
mutual consent of the beneficiaries is likely a mixed question of law and fact. 
Preservation for Appeal 
This issue was preserved for appeal by being addressed in Phillip's Trial Brief and 
in closing arguments at the trial of this matter. [R. 957, 964-969 (Phillip Southwick's 
Trial Brief); R. 1092 (Trial Transcript at 400-409)]. 
1 
II. WAS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF DETREMENTAL RELIANCE 
BY PHILLIP WITH RESPECT TO ITS APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE? 
Standard of Review 
Appellate Courts "will affirm a trial court's ruling against a sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge unless it is clearly erroneous." Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, 
122, 181P.3d791. 
Preservation for Appeal 
The Brief of Appellant does not contain a citation to the record showing that this 
issue was preserved in the trial court. See Appellant's Brief at 2-3. 
III. WAS THE TRIAL COURT CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT PHILLIP 
DID NOT BREACH HIS DUTY OF LOYALTY TO TRACY IN 
ADMINISTERING THE TRUST? 
Standard of Review 
Since the facts are not disputed, the issue of whether Phillip breached his fiduciary 
duty of loyalty to Tracy "is a mixed question of law and fact" for which the trial court is 
afforded "ample discretion." Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, ]f 10, 155 P.3d 917. 
Preservation for Appeal 
The Appellant's Brief does not contain a citation to the record showing that this 
issue was preserved in the trial court. See Appellant's Brief at 1-2. 
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STATUTES DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL 
I. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-802 (2008). 
(1) A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries. 
(2) Subject to the rights of persons dealing with or assisting the trustee as provided in 
Section 75-7-1012, a sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or 
management of trust property entered into by the trustee for the trustee's own personal 
account or which is otherwise affected by a conflict between the trustee's fiduciary and 
personal interests is voidable by a beneficiary affected by the transaction unless: 
(a) the transaction was authorized by the terms of the trust; (b) the transaction was 
approved by the court; (c) the beneficiary did not commence a judicial proceeding 
within the time allowed by Section 75-7-1005; (d) the beneficiary consented to the 
trustee's conduct, ratified the transaction, or released the trustee in compliance with 
Section 75-7-1009; or (e) the transaction involves a contract entered into or claim 
acquired by the trustee before the person became or contemplated becoming trustee. 
(3) A sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or management of 
trust property is presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary 
interests if it is entered into by the trustee with: 
(a) the trustee's spouse; (b) the trustee's descendants, siblings, parents, or their spouses; 
(c) an agent of the trustee, including but not limited to an attorney, accountant, or 
financial advisor; or (d) a corporation or other person or enterprise in which the trustee, 
or a person that owns a significant interest in the trustee, has an interest that might 
affect the trustee's best judgment. 
(4) A transaction between a trustee and a beneficiary that does not concern trust property 
but that occurs during the existence of the trust or while the trustee retains significant 
influence over the beneficiary and from which the trustee obtains an advantage is 
voidable by the beneficiary unless the trustee establishes that the transaction was fair to 
the beneficiary. 
(5) A transaction not concerning trust property in which the trustee engages in the 
trustee's individual capacity involves a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests if 
the transaction concerns an opportunity properly belonging to the trust. 
(6) An investment by a trustee in securities of an investment company or investment trust 
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to which the trustee, or its affiliate, provides services in a capacity other than as trustee is 
not presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests if the 
investment complies with the prudent investor rule of Section 75-7-901. The trustee may 
be compensated by the investment company or investment trust for providing those 
services out of fees charged to the trust. 
(7) In voting shares of stock or in exercising powers of control over similar interests in 
other forms of enterprise, the trustee shall act in the best interests of Ihe beneficiaries. If 
the trust is the sole owner of a corporation or other form of enterprise, the trustee shall 
elect or appoint directors or other managers who will manage the corporation or 
enterprise in the best interests of the beneficiaries. 
(8) This section does not preclude the following actions by the trustee: 
(a) an agreement between the trustee and a beneficiary relating to the appointment or 
compensation of the trustee; (b) payment of reasonable compensation to the trustee; (c) 
a transaction between a trust and another trust, decedent's estate, conservatorship, or 
guardianship of which the trustee is a fiduciary or in which a beneficiary has an interest; 
(d) a deposit of trust money in a regulated financial service institution operated by the 
trustee; (e) an advance by the trustee of money for the protection of the trust; (f) 
collecting, holding, and retaining trust assets received from a trustor until, in the 
judgment of the trustee, disposition of the assets should be made, even though the assets 
include an asset in which the trustee is personally interested; (g) acquiring an undivided 
interest in a trust asset in which the trustee, in any trust capacity, holds an undivided 
interest; (h) borrowing money to be repaid from the trust assets or otherwise; (i) 
advancing money to be repaid from the assets or otherwise; (j) employing persons, 
including attorneys, auditors, investment advisers, or agents, even if they are associated 
with the trustee: (i) to advise or assist the trustee in the performance of the trustee's 
administrative duties or perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary; 
or (ii) to act without independent investigation upon their recommendations; (k) if a 
governing instrument or order requires or authorizes investment in United States 
government obligations, investing in those obligations, either directly or in the form of 
securities or other interests, in any open-end or closed-end management type 
investment company or investment trust registered under the provisions of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15U.S.C. Sections 80a-1 through 80a-64 if: (i) the 
portfolio of the investment company or investment trust is limited to United States 
government obligations, and repurchase agreements are fully collateralized by United 
States government obligations; and (ii) the investment company or investment trust 
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takes delivery of the collateral for any repurchase agreement either directly or through 
an authorized custodian. 
(9) The court may appoint a special fiduciary to make a decision with respect to any 
proposed transaction that might violate this section if entered into by the trustee. 
IL UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802 (1991). 
See addendum of Appellant's Brief. 
III. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-411 (2004). 
(1) A noncharitable, irrevocable trust may be modified or terminated upon consent of the 
settlor and all beneficiaries, even if the modification or termination is inconsistent with a 
material purpose of the trust. A settlor's power to consent to a trust's termination may be 
exercised by an agent under a power of attorney only to the extent expressly authorized 
by the power of attorney or the terms of the trust, by the settlor's conservator with the 
approval of the court supervising the conservatorship if an agent is not so authorized, or 
by the settlor's guardian with the approval of the court supervising the guardianship if an 
agent is not so authorized and a conservator has not been appointed. 
(2) A noncharitable, irrevocable trust may be terminated upon consent of all of the 
beneficiaries if the court concludes that continuance of the trust is not necessary to 
achieve any material purpose of the trust. A noncharitable, irrevocable trust may be 
modified upon consent of all of the beneficiaries if the court concludes that modification 
is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust. 
(3) A spendthrift provision in the terms of the trust is not presumed to constitute a 
material purpose of the trust. 
(4) Upon termination of a trust under Subsection (1) or (2), the trustee shall distribute the 
trust property as agreed by the beneficiaries. 
(5) If not all of the beneficiaries consent to a proposed modification or termination of the 
trust under Subsection (1) or (2), the modification or termination may be approved by the 
court if the court is satisfied that: 
(a) if all of the beneficiaries had consented, the trust could have been modified or 
terminated under this section; and 
(b) the interests of a beneficiary who does not consent will be adequately protected. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The first question presented by this case is whether Tracy's status as a beneficiary 
of the Trust was terminated by virtue of his execution of the Waiver and Assignment 
and/or the letters Tracy sent to Phillip and Robert S. Milner ("Robert"). Tracy's Wavier 
and Assignment substantially complied with Utah's Disclaimer Statute, and even if it did 
not, Tracy's Waiver and Assignment and/or his letters served as a waiver of Tracy's 
beneficial interest in the Trust. Furthermore, the sole settlor of the Trust and all of the 
beneficiaries of the Trust mutually agreed to modify the Trust such that Tracy no longer 
retained his status as a beneficiary. 
If the Court finds that Tracy's status as a beneficiary of the Trust was not 
terminated, the Court must evaluate the trial court's conclusions—giving due 
consideration to the unique facts of this case— that Tracy should be estopped from 
claiming a beneficial interest in the Trust prior to the filing of the Complaint in this 
matter. In any case, Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy, and even 
if he did, Tracy is estopped from making such an assertion. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS/DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
Tracy filed a Complaint on January 4, 2006. [R. 1-26 (Complaint)]. Pursuant to a 
motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that the Decree of Divorce issued by 
Judge Gunnell on November 4, 1991 did not operate to terminate Tracy's beneficial 
interest in the Trust despite the statements made therein to the contrary since the court 
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that issued the decree did not have authority to affect the interests of the beneficiaries not 
a party to the divorce. [R. 517-23 (Memorandum Decision)]. 
A two-day bench trial was conducted before the Honorable Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
on June 16-17, 2009. [R. 1004-09 (Bench Trial Minutes)]. Following the bench trial, 
Judge Hadfield concluded that Tracy's Waiver and Assignment did not substantially 
comply with Utah's Disclaimer Statute, that under the circumstances Phillip did not 
breach any fiduciary duties to Tracy, and that Tracy was equitably estopped from 
claiming a beneficial interest in the Trust prior to the filing of his Complaint. [R. 1092 
(Trial Transcript at 415-419); R. 1066-76 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 13, 1989, a Trust Agreement drafted by attorney Dale M. Dorius 
was executed by Don Southwick ("Don") and Barbara Southwick ("Barbara"), as 
husband and wife, for the purpose of creating a Trust. [R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact 
ffl[ 1,2); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"1]. The Trust Agreement 
provided that Phillip, Robert, and Tracy were beneficiaries of the Trust. [R. 1066, 1067 
(Findings of Fact If 3); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"]. Robert is 
The trial court did not include the trial exhibits when it transmitted the record to Phillip. 
In fact, it was only today that the trial court notified Phillip that it had located the trial 
exhibits. Since this brief is due today, and it is not feasible to retrieve the trial exhibits 
prior to the deadline for filing this brief, Phillip's copies of the relevant exhibits offered 
into evidence at trial will be included in the Addendum attached hereto. The trial court's 
copies of the trial exhibits will then be provided in an addendum to Phillip's reply brief 
on the issues Phillip has raised on appeal. 
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Barbara's son from a previous marriage, Tracy is Don's son from a previous marriage, 
and Phillip is the son of both Don and Barbara. [R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact ^ 4)]. 
The Trust Agreement provided for Phillip to serve as the Trustee of the Trust. [R. 
1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact 1j 5); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"]. As 
Trustee, Phillip was to disburse to Don and Barbara "such amounts from the principal or 
income of the Trust Estate as they shall from time to time direct" during their lifetimes. 
[R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact 16); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"]. 
However, Don and Barbara's marriage was dissolved by a Decree of Divorce 
issued by Judge Gunnell on November 4, 1991. [R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact ^ 7); R. 
1008 (Def. Exhibit 3); Addendum Exhibit "B"]. This Decree of Divorce mandated that 
Barbara was to be the sole beneficiary of the Trust and directed "the Trustee, Phillip D. 
Southwick, to do whatever is necessary to . . . make Barbara P. Southwick the sole 
beneficiary of the assets in the trust as her sole and separate property." [R. 1066, 1067 
(Findings of Fact | 8); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 3); Addendum Exhibit "B"]. 
Phillip was aware of the divorce proceedings while they were pending and was 
aware of the result of the divorce at the time it was issued and relied upon the Decree of 
Divorce in performing his duties as Trustee of the Trust going forward. [R. 1066, 1068 
(Findings of Fact ]( 9)]. Specifically, Phillip reasonably understood that his mother, 
Barbara, was to be the sole owner and/or beneficiary of all of the Trust assets and as such 
could control them. [R. 1066, 1068 (Findings of Fact 1j 9)]. 
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Consistent with the Decree of Divorce, Don and Barbara signed a document 
referred to herein as the Joint Release that directed Phillip "to convey and transfer all of 
the assets located in [the Trust] to Barbara P. Southwick as the sole beneficiary under the 
terms of said Trust Agreement." [R. 1066, 1068 (Findings of Fact ffif 10,11); R. 1008 
(Def. Exhibit 5); Addendum Exhibit "C"]. Barbara delivered, and Phillip approved and 
accepted into the Trust, the signed Joint Release on or about December 12, 1991. [R. 
1066, 1068 (Findings of Fact ffif 12,13); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 5); Addendum Exhibit 
"C"]. 
Tracy knew about the existence of the Trust and his beneficial interest therein 
within a few weeks after Don and Barbara's divorce at the latest. [R. 1066, 1068 
(Findings of Fact ]f 14)]. On January 31, 1992, Tracy signed a document which had been 
prepared by attorney Dale M. Dorius as per Barbara's instructions and which is referred 
to herein as the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1066, 1068 (Findings of Fact ]f 15); R. 1008 
(Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"]. At this time, Tracy was aware of the outcome 
of the divorce, namely the property distribution and Barbara's status as the sole 
beneficiary of the Trust, and that all trust assets were to be transferred to her. [R. 1066, 
1068 (Findings of Fact 115)]. 
In signing the Waiver and Assignment, Tracy purported to renounce "any claim he 
may have in any of the Trust Estate including income and/or principal, all cash including 
bank accounts, and all proceeds from life insurance policies and further[] said Trustee to 
distribute his share of the Trust Estate to PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK." [R. 1066, 1069 
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(Findings of Fact 116); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"]. Barbara 
delivered the Waiver and Assignment to Phillip, who as Trustee approved and accepted 
the Waiver and Assignment into the Trust on March 12, 1992. [R. 1066, 1069 (Findings 
of Fact H 17); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"]. 
At that time, Phillip knew that attorney Dale Dorius had prepared the Trust and 
other Trust documents, had advised Don and Barbara off and on regarding the Trust, and 
had prepared the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact |^ 17)]. 
Phillip believed that the Decree of Divorce was a valid directive requiring that Barbara 
become the sole Trustor and sole Beneficiary of the Trust, and that as a result she was 
free to modify and/or terminate the Trust and/or control the property at her discretion. 
[R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact If 24)]. 
Barbara told Phillip that she planned and intended to carry on with the Trust, since 
Don and Tracy were no longer beneficiaries, in order to avoid potential federal tax 
consequences associated with having all of the Trust property transferred to her 
individually and to avoid the inconvenience and cost of setting up a new trust. [R. 1066, 
1070 (Findings of Fact ^ 25)]. She also told Phillip that it was her intent and desire that 
Robert and Phillip receive the trust property upon her death and that accordingly they 
remain as beneficiaries of the Trust and that the property would be evenly split between 
Phillip and Robert upon her death. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact If 26)]. 
For these reasons, Phillip reasonably believed it unnecessary to transfer all of the 
Trust property from a trust which purportedly no longer named Don or Tracy as 
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beneficiaries into a second trust of the same status. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact ^ 
27)]. As a result of Barbara's expression of her plans and intent, Phillip and Robert did 
not ever purport to renounce their interests in the Trust, nor were they asked to renounce 
their interest in the Trust. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact 1j 28)]. 
Barbara died in February of 2002. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact 129)]. In a 
letter addressed to and received by Phillip dated April 7, 2002, which was drafted over 
ten years after Tracy signed the Waiver and Assignment, Tracy wrote that he did not 
remember whether or not he signed the Waiver and Assignment, that he was not going to 
do anything about the Trust, and that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they wanted 
with the Trust assets. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact 130); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 7); 
Addendum Exhibit "E"]. In a letter addressed to and received by Robert dated April 20, 
2002, Tracy again wrote that he did not remember whether or not he signed the Waiver 
and Assignment, that he was not going to do anything about the Trust, and that Phillip 
and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the Trust assets. [R. 1066, 1071 
(Findings of Fact If 31); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 8); Addendum Exhibit "F"]. 
Just prior to writing these letters, Tracy and Phillip had argued over Tracy's 
claimed interest in the Trust and/or assets of Barbara, with Tracy claiming he still had an 
interest, and Phillip arguing otherwise. [R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact f 32)]. After 
Barbara's death and the receipt of Tracy's letter dated April 7, 2002, Phillip liquidated or 
sold some real property and distributed those proceeds and a few other Trust assets 
equally between himself and Robert under the reasonable belief that he and Robert were 
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the only beneficiaries of the Trust in reasonable reliance upon the Waiver and 
Assignment as well as Tracy's letters stating that Phillip and Robert could do whatever 
they wanted with the estate and that Tracy wasn't going to anything about it. [R. 1066, 
1071 (Findings of Fact If 33)]. 
Tracy made a statement that he was renouncing his beneficial interest in the Trust 
by signing the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact 1j 19); R. 1008 
(Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"]. Phillip would not have made the Trust 
property distributions he made, or would have taken other measures, had Tracy not 
signed the Waiver and Assignment and not written the letters containing statements that 
Tracy did not remember whether or not he signed the Waiver and Assignment, was not 
going to do anything about the Trust, and that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they 
wanted with the Trust assets. [R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact 134)]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT TRACY'S 
STATUS AS A BENEFICIARY OF THE TRUST WAS NOT 
TERMINATED. 
The trial court found that the Waiver and Assignment executed by Tracy did not 
substantially comply with the version of Utah's Disclaimer Statute in effect when Tracy 
signed the Waiver and Assignment. However, Tracy's Waiver and Assignment strictly 
complied with the first three prongs of the applicable disclaimer statute. Furthermore, the 
fourth prong of the disclaimer statute was directory and no one, including Tracy, suffered 
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prejudice by the failure of the Waiver and Assignment to strictly comply with the fourth 
prong. 
Tracy's Wavier and Assignment and/or the letters he drafted to Phillip and Robert 
also served as an effective waiver of Tracy's beneficial interest in the Trust. 
Furthermore, the undisputed evidence presented at trial also established that the sole 
settlor of the Trust and all of the beneficiaries of the Trust—including Tracy—mutually 
agreed to modify the Trust for the purpose of terminating Tracy's status as a beneficiary 
of the Trust. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION OF DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE 
BY PHILLIP WITH RESPECT TO ITS APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL IS SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. 
In examining Tracy's argument that Tracy should not be equitably estopped from 
asserting a beneficial interest in the Trust prior to the filing of Tracy's Complaint, it is 
clear that Tracy's argument is really an attack on the trial court's findings of fact. 
Evidence was presented to the trial court that Phillip would suffer a detriment if Tracy 
were permitted by the trial court to assert that he did not renounce his beneficial interest 
in the Trust prior to the filing of the Complaint. 
As a result, Tracy has failed to fulfill his duty to marshal the evidence. 
Furthermore, the evidence presented to the trial court establishes that the trial court's 
findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and that it did not exceed the bounds of its 
significant discretion with respect to its legal conclusion that Phillip would suffer a 
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detriment if Tracy were permitted by the trial court to assert that he did not renounce his 
beneficial interest in the Trust prior to the filing of the Complaint. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT PHILLIP DID 
NOT BREACH A FIDUCIARY DUTY OF LOYALTY TO TRACY. 
In examining Tracy's argument that Phillip breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty 
to Tracy, it is clear that Tracy's argument is really an attack on the trial court's findings 
of fact. However, Tracy failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings of fact and consequently is barred from challenging the conclusion of law based 
thereon that Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy. 
In addition, a review of all of the facts and circumstances—as opposed to a few 
out-of-context facts—surrounding the trial court's conclusion that Phillip did not breach a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy confirms that the trial court did not abuse its ample 
discretion. Furthermore, Tracy has failed to challenge the trial court" s holding that Tracy 
is equitably estopped from asserting that Phillip breached his fiduciary duties prior to the 
filing of the Complaint in this matter. 
IV. AFFIRMATION ON OTHER GROUNDS. 
Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty to Tracy by administering the Trust as 
though Tracy were not a beneficiary since Phillip could not justifiably disregard the 
Decree of Divorce. Furthermore, Tracy should not be entitled to assert that he was a 
beneficiary of the Trust prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter siace the Decree 
of Divorce was valid until it was set aside by the trial court after the filing of the 
Complaint. 
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ARGUMENTS 
Phillip will first address the issue forming the basis of Phillip's cross-appeal: 
whether the trial court erred in not concluding that Tracy's status as a beneficiary of the 
Trust was terminated. If the trail court did err, then an analysis of Tracy's appeal is 
unnecessary. Tracy's argument that the trial court's conclusion of detrimental reliance by 
Phillip was not supported by evidence will then be addressed, followed by an analysis of 
Tracy's claim that Phillip breached a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy by making 
distributions from the Trust to Phillip and Robert. In conclusion, an alternative ground to 
uphold the trial court's judgment will be set forth. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT TRACY'S 
STATUS AS A BENEFICIARY OF THE TRUST WAS NOT 
TERMINATED. 
Tracy's beneficial interest in the Trust was terminated by either (a) substantial 
compliance with Utah's Disclaimer Statute; (b) waiver; or (c) mutual modification of the 
Trust. 
A. Substantial Compliance with Utah's Disclaimer Statute. 
Tracy's Waiver and Assignment substantially complied with the Disclaimer 
Statute in effect when Tracy signed the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 
6); Addendum Exhibit "D"]. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court: 
[Substantial compliance with a statutory provision is adequate when the provision 
is directory, meaning it goes merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of 
the business, and the policy behind the statute has still been realized. Additionally, 
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a reviewing court should apply the substantial compliance standard only when no 
prejudice occurs as a result of failure to follow the direction of the statute. 
Aaron and Morey Bonds and Bail v. Third Dist. Court, 2007 UT 24,17,156 P.3d 
801 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The trial court found that Tracy signed the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1092 
(Trial Transcript at 416); R. 1066, 1068-69 (Findings of Fact fflf 15-16, 20)]. When Tracy 
signed the Waiver and Assignment, Utah's Disclaimer Statute provided that a 
"beneficiary under a nontestamentary instrument. . . may disclaim in whole or in part the 
right of transfer to the person of any property or interest in it by delivering or filing a 
written disclaimer under this section." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802(l)(a) (1991). In 
this case, the Waiver and Assignment was delivered to Phillip in his capacity as trustee of 
the Trust. [R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact \ 17)]. 
The Disclaimer Statute further provided that "[t]he disclaimer shall: (i) describe 
the property or interest in it disclaimed; (ii) declare the disclaimer and extent of it; (iii) be 
signed by the disclaimant; and (iv) state that the disclaimer is proper under Subsection 
(4), and was made within the required time limits." Id, § 75-2-802(1 )(b). An inspection 
of Tracy's Waiver and Assignment reveals that it strictly complies with the first three 
disclaimer prongs since it is signed by Tracy and adequately describes the property 
disclaimed and the extent of the disclaimer. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum 
Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact ^ 16)]. 
Although Tracy's Waiver and Assignment does not specifically state that it is 
proper under Subsection (4) or made within the required time limits, it was in fact proper 
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under Subsection (4) and was made within the required time limits. [R. 1008 (Def. 
Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact H 16)]. Subsection 
(4) sets forth four situations that preclude the right to disclaim trust property: 
The right to disclaim property or an interest in it is barred by: (i) an assignment, 
conveyance, encumbrance, pledge, or transfer of the property or interest, or a 
contract therefor; (ii) a written waiver of the right to disclaim; (iii) an acceptance 
of the property or interest or benefit thereunder; or (iv) a sale of the property or 
interest under judicial sale made before the disclaimer is effected. 
Id. § 75-2-802(4)(a). 
In this case, there is no evidence that Tracy assigned, conveyed, encumbered, 
pledged, or transfered the Trust property or his interest in the Trust (or entered into a 
contract therefor) prior to his execution of the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1091 (Trial 
Transcript at 52-126,140-167)]. Similarly, there is no evidence that Tracy ever waived in 
writing the right to disclaim his interest in the Trust. [R. 1091 (Trial Transcript at 52-
126,140-167)]. Furthermore, Tracy had not accepted the property interest or benefit 
contemplated by the Trust when he signed the Waiver and Assignment and there is no 
evidence that the Trust property or Tracy's interest in the Trust had been sold pursuant to 
a judicial sale prior to the acceptance of the Waiver and Assignment by the Trust. [R. 
1091 (Trial Transcript at 52-126,140-167)]. 
With respect to whether the Waiver and Assignment was made within the required 
time limit, "the [disclaimer] shall be delivered or filed not later than nine months after the 
person has actual knowledge of the existence of the interest." Id. § 75-2-802(2)(a). 
Tracy first learned of the existence of the Trust and his interest therein within a few 
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weeks after the divorce of Don and Barbara on November 4,1991. [R. 1066, 1068 
(Findings of Fact f 14)]. Tracy signed the Waiver and Assignment ou January 31, 1992. 
[R. 1066, 1068 (Findings of Fact If 15)]. The Waiver and Assignment was delivered to 
and accepted by Phillip, the trustee, by March 12, 1992. [R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact 
117)]. Accordingly, Tracy's Waiver and Assignment was made within the required time 
limit. 
Based on these undisputed facts, Tracy's Waiver and Assignment substantially 
complies with the Disclaimer Statute. First, Tracy did not present any evidence that he or 
anyone else was prejudiced by the failure of the Waiver and Assignment to explicitly 
state that the disclaimer was proper under Subsection (4) and was made within the 
required time limits. [R. 1091 (Trial Transcript at 52-126,140-167)]. Furthermore, the 
Disclaimer Statute's provision that a disclaimer must explicitly state that it is proper 
under Subsection (4) and timely made is directory since it goes to the proper and orderly 
execution of a disclaimer. 
The failure of a disclaimer to recite that it was proper under Subsection (4) and 
made within the required time limits does not thwart the policy behind the Disclaimer 
Statute, which is to provide an avenue for a beneficiary to disclaim his or her beneficial 
interest in a trust, in cases such as this where the disclaimer was in fact proper and timely 
made. In contrast, the first three prongs of the Disclaimer Statute constitute the essence 
of a disclaimer and are not merely directory. Consequently, strict compliance is required 
of the first three prongs since their exclusion from a disclaimer would thwart the purpose 
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and policy behind the Disclaimer Statue. Indeed, the legislature subsequently dispensed 
with the requirement that a disclaimer include an explicit statement that it was proper 
under Subsection (4) and timely made even though disclaimers must still be proper and 
timely. &e UTAH CODE A m § 75-2-801 (1998). 
Tracy's Waiver and Assignment substantially complied with the Disclaimer 
Statute in effect when Tracy signed the Waiver and Assignment. Accordingly, Tracy's 
status as a beneficiary of the Trust ceased when Phillip accepted the Waiver and 
Assignment into the Trust. To hold otherwise would exalt form over substance. As a 
result, the trial court erred in concluding that Tracy's Waiver and Assignment did not 
substantially comply with the Disclaimer Statute. 
B. Waiver. 
Tracy effectively waived his beneficial interest in the Trust by executing the 
Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"]. The 
Disclaimer Statute explicitly provides, "[t]his section does not abridge the right of 
persons to waive, release, assign, convey, disclaim, or renounce property or an interest in 
it under any other statute." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802(5) (1991). In other words, 
compliance with the Disclaimer Statute was not the only method by which Tracy was 
entitled to effectively relinquish his beneficial interest in the Trust. Indeed, the equitable 
doctrine of waiver, which has been incorporated into Utah's Uniform Trust Code by 
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statute, is one method by which a beneficiary can relinquish a beneficial interest in a 
trust notwithstanding a spendthrift provision. 
"Waiver requires three elements: (1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) 
knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the right." Soter's, Inc. v. 
Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass % 857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). Applied to the case 
at bar, Tracy was a beneficiary of the Trust pursuant to the executeon of the Trust 
Agreement. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings 
of Fact <([ 3)]. Tracy knew of his status as a beneficiary of the Trust. [R. 1066, 1068 
(Findings of Fact U 14)]. Tracy intended to completely relinquish his beneficial interest 
in the Trust by signing the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6); 
Addendum Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact If 16)]. As a result, Tracy 
ceased at that point to be a beneficiary of the Trust under the equitable doctrine of 
waiver. 
Even if the Court finds that Tracy's Waiver and Assignment was not an effective 
waiver, Tracy's letters to Phillip and Robert in April of 2002 effectively waived his 
beneficial interest in the Trust as well as the claim that Tracy is now asserting that Phillip 
breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit Tflf 7-8); Addendum 
Exhibits "E", "F"]. Tracy argued to Phillip that he was a beneficiar> of the Trust prior to 
sending letters to Phillip and Robert in April of 2002. [R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact % 
2
 "The common law of trusts and principles of equity supplement this chapter, except to 
the extent modified by this chapter or laws of this state." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-106 
(Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). 
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32)]. Tracy also knew at that time about the principal Trust asset—the real property in 
Lehi, Utah. [R. 1091 (Trial Transcript at 71 If 23 - 73 1f 15)]. 
In a letter addressed to and received by Phillip dated April 7, 2002, Tracy wrote 
that he was not going to do anything about the Trust and that Phillip and Robert could do 
whatever they wanted with the Trust assets. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit ]f 7); Addendum 
Exhibit "E"; R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact ^ 30)]. In a letter addressed to and received 
by Robert dated April 20, 2002, Tracy again wrote that he was not going to do anything 
about the Trust and that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the Trust 
assets. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit Tf 8); Addendum Exhibit "F"; R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of 
Fact If 31)]. 
Tracy's letters clearly manifest an intention to relinquish any interest that he had 
in the Trust at that time and any claims he had or would have against Phillip for not 
recognizing his beneficial interest in the Trust. As a result, Tracy waived both his 
beneficial interest in the Trust and the claims he is now asserting against Phillip for 
breaching his fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy. 
C. Mutual Modification of the Trust. 
The evidence presented to the trail court establishes that Don, Barbara, Phillip, 
Robert, and Tracy all mutually agreed to effect a modification of the Trust by terminating 
Tracy's beneficial interest in the Trust. As noted by the Utah Supreme Court, "all 
beneficiaries can terminate a trust even though its continuance is necessary to carry out a 
material purpose of the trust when the settlor(s) consent to its termination." Sundquist v. 
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Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 187 n.2 (Utah 1981). It is axiomatic that the power of 
termination also carries with it the power of modification: "[a] noncharitable, irrevocable 
trust may be modified or terminated upon consent of the settler and all beneficiaries, 
even if the modification or termination is inconsistent with a material purpose of the 
trust." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-411 (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). 
In this case, the beneficiaries (Phillip, Robert and Tracy) and settlors (Don and 
Barbara) all agreed to modify the Trust at least to the extent of making Barbara the sole 
beneficiary of the Trust, which in turn would allow Barbara to do whatever she desired 
with the Trust. Don and Barbara affirmatively consented to the trust modification by 
signing the Joint Release. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit | 5); Addendum EKhibit "C"; R. 1066, 
1068 (Findings of Fact fflf 10,11)]. Tracy affirmatively consented to the trust 
modification by signing the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit ]f 6); 
Addendum Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact If 16)]. Phillip affirmatively 
consented to trust modification by accepting the Joint Release and the Waiver and 
Assignment into the Trust. [R. 1066, 1068-69 (Findings of Fact ffl| 12,13, 17)]. Robert 
testified that he affirmatively consented to the trust modification. [R. 1092 (Trial 
Transcript at 273-274)]. 
Since everyone associated with the Trust consented to Barbara as the sole 
beneficiary and owner of the Trust, the Trust was modified by mutual consent and Tracy 
ceased thereafter to be a beneficiary of the Trust. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION OF DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE 
BY PHILLIP WITH RESPECT TO ITS APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL IS SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. 
The trial court held that "Tracy is equitably estopped from asserting that, prior to 
the filing of the Complaint in the above-entitled matter, he did not renounce his beneficial 
interest in the Trust." [R. 1066, 1074 (Conclusions of Law K 14)]. 
To prevail on an equitable estoppel claim, a defendant must prove that (1) a party 
made "a statement, admission, act, or failure to act. . . inconsistent with a claim 
later asserted;" (2) defendant changed his position or took action in reliance on 
that "statement, admission, act, or failure to act;" and (3) the defendant's reliance 
would operate to his detriment if the court allowed the other "party to contradict or 
repudiate" its earlier "statement, admission, act, or failure to act." 
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 34, 70 P.3d 111 (quoting CECO Corp. v. Concrete 
Specialists, Inc., 72 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989)). 
On appeal, Tracy's only challenge to the trial court's application of equitable 
estoppel is his assertion that the trial court was not presented with any evidence of 
detrimental reliance by Phillip. See Appellants Brief at 13-14. This assertion is incorrect 
and reflects Tracy's failure to fulfill his obligation to marshal the evidence. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires "[a] party 
challenging a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." See also State v. Clark 2005 UT 75,117, 124 P.3d 235; 
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, Tj 21, 54 P.3d 1177. To 
pass this threshold, parties protesting findings of fact must "marshal all the 
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below." Clark, 2005 UT 75, \ 17, 124 P.3d 235 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, \ 24, 
140 P.3d 1200. 
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An appellant "must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists." Id. at ^ 77 (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, an appellant 
may not simply review the evidence presented at trial, nor may she "re-argue the 
factual case [she] presented in the trial court." Id. If an appellant argues that no 
evidence supports a factual finding, the burden to marshal does not then shift 
to the appellee; rather, the appellee may prove that the appellant did not meet 
her marshaling burden by presenting a "scintilla" of evidence supporting the 
district court's finding. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ]f 
22, 54P.3dll77. 
Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, ^ 25, 112 P.3d 495 (emphasis added). Every "scrap" of 
evidence includes all inferences from the evidence. See State v. Valdez, 203 UT App 
100,f 20 n.l 1,68 P.3d 1052. 
This does not mean that the party may simply provide an exhaustive review of all 
evidence presented at trial. Id. at \ 12 n. 1. Rather, appellants must provide a 
precisely focused summary of all the evidence supporting the findings they 
challenge. Id. This summary must correlate all particular items of evidence with 
the challenged findings and then convince us that the trial court erred in the 
assessment of that evidence to its findings. W. Valley City v. Majestic Inv., Co., 
818P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f77, 100 P.3d 1177. 
Once the evidence is marshaled, only then is an appellate court in a position to 
fairly evaluate whether the trial court's findings of fact were adequately supported by 
evidence. 
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In 
order to establish that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, an appellant 
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence. If the evidence is inadequately 
marshaled, [the Utah Supreme Court] assumes that all findings are adequately 
supported by the evidence. 
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Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 19, 100 P.3d 1177 (internal quotation marks, alterations, 
and citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting 
Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, \ 27, 140 P.3d 1200 ("We repeatedly have 
warned of the grim consequences parties face when they fail to fulfill the marshaling 
requirement"). 
Incidentally, Tracy is still required to marshal the evidence even if he is only 
challenging the trial court's legal conclusions related to its application of equitable 
estoppel. It is well established that "estoppel is a 'mixed question of law and fact of an 
extremely fact-sensitive nature to which we grant significant deference.'" Save 
Beaver County v. Beaver County, 2009 UT 8, If 9, 203 P.3d 937 (quoting Glew v. Ohio 
Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, If 19, 181 P.3d 791) (emphasis added). 
If the application of the standard is extremely fact sensitive, then the reviewing 
court should generally give the trial court considerable discretion in determining 
whether the facts of a particular case come within the established rule of law. 
Even where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal ruling, as here, if a 
determination of the correctness of a courts9 application of a legal standard is 
extremely fact-sensitive, the defendants also have a duty to marshal the 
evidence. 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, If 20, 100 P.3d 1177 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
The foregoing case law clearly establishes that Tracy is under an obligation to 
marshal the evidence regardless of whether he frames the issue as a challenge to the trial 
court's findings of fact or the trial court's legal conclusions. Importantly, an appellant 
cannot delay its obligation to marshal the evidence until he files his reply brief. Indeed, 
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"this eleventh-hour attempt to marshal the evidence and challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence in the reply brief is too late": 
An appellant seeking to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
finding of fact must undertake and meet its heavy marshalling burden in its 
opening memorandum of law on appeal. An appellant cannot hold its sufficiency 
of the evidence challenge in reserve and wait to marshal the evidence in its reply 
brief Allowing such a procedure would deprive the appellee of any opportunity to 
respond and defend the sufficiency of the evidence and the findings of fact. 
Atlas Steel Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com fn, 2002 UT 112, U 40-41, 61 P.3d 1053. 
In this case, a comparison of Tracy's brief with a "scintilla" of evidence from the 
record reveals that Tracy failed to meet his burden to marshal the evidence. See 
Appellant's Brief at 14 ("there is no record evidence to support a finding of detrimental 
reliance by Phillip"). With respect to the first element of equitable estoppel, Tracy has 
not argued that the trial court's findings of fact were not supported by evidence or clearly 
erroneous with respect to its findings that Tracy made statements that he was renouncing 
his beneficial interest in the Trust and that he would not make a claim against the Trust. 
See Appellant's Brief at 13-14. These statements were obviously inconsistent with his 
later-asserted claims in this matter. [R. 1-26 (Complaint); R. 1092 (Trial Transcript at 
370-390)]. 
Furthermore, Tracy has not argued that the trial court exceeded its significant 
discretion in concluding that these statements satisfied the first element of equitable 
estoppel. See Appellant's Brief at 13-14. Accordingly, evidence of Tracy's statements 
satisfying the first prong of equitable estoppel shall be set forth with references to the 
trial court's oral ruling at the conclusion of the bench trial and its findings of fact since "it 
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is presumed the findings of fact of the trial court are supported by evidence." See Clark 
v. Jennings, 98 P.2d 348, 348 (Utah 1940). 
On January 31, 1992, Tracy signed a statement (the Waiver and Assignment) 
renouncing "any claim he may have in any of the Trust Estate including income and/or 
principal, all cash including bank accounts, and all proceeds from life insurance policies." 
[R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit H 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1068-69 (Findings of Fact 
fflf 15-16)]. Thereafter, Tracy drafted a letter dated April 7, 2002 that was addressed to 
and received by Phillip wherein Tracy stated that he did not remember whether or not he 
signed the Waiver and Assignment, but that he was not going to do anything about the 
Trust, and that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the Trust assets. 
[R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit \ 7); Addendum Exhibit "E"; R. 1066, 1070-71 (Findings of Fact 
130)]. 
Tracy also drafted a letter dated April 20, 2002 that was addressed to and received 
by Robert wherein Tracy again stated that he did not remember whether or not he signed 
the Waiver and Assignment, that he was not going to do anything about the Trust, and 
that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the Trust assets. [R. 1008 
(Def. Exhibit \ 8); Addendum Exhibit "F"; R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact \ 31)]. 
According to the trial court, "Tracy's letters to Phillip and Robert in April 2002, at least 
six separate times in those two letters, say that Tracy will not assert a claim. They say it 
in several ways, but they say it at least six times in the two letters." [R. 1092 (Trial 
Transcript at 417)]. 
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With respect to the second element of equitable estoppel, Tracy has not argued 
that the trial court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous with respect to its finding that 
Phillip reasonably changed his position or took action in reliance on Tracy's statements 
that he was renouncing his beneficial interest in the Trust and was not going to assert a 
claim against the Trust. See Appellant's Brief at 13-14. Similarly, Tracy has not argued 
that the trial court exceeded its significant discretion in concluding that the second 
element of equitable estoppel was established by Phillip's reliance on Tracy's statements. 
See Appellant's Brief at 13-14. 
Accordingly, evidence of Phillip's reliance on Tracy's statements shall be set forth 
with reference to the trial court's oral ruling and its findings of fact since "it is presumed 
the findings of fact of the trial court are supported by evidence." See Clark v. Jennings, 
98 P.2d 348, 348 (Utah 1940). 
After . . . the receipt of Tracy's letter dated April 7, 2002, Phillip liquidated or sold 
some real property and distributed those proceeds and a few other Trust assets 
equally between himself and Robert under the reasonable belief that he and Robert 
were the only beneficiaries of the Trust in reasonable reliance upon the Waiver 
and Assignment as well as Tracy's letters stating that Phillip and Robert could do 
whatever they wanted with the estate and that Tracy wasn't going to anything 
about it. 
R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact 1j 33). In other words, 
When the defendant trustee, Phillip, sold the property and distributed [the 
proceeds] in March of 2005, it seems to the Court that he reasonably relied on 
[Tracy's Waiver and Assignment] and on Tracy's multiple written assertions that 
he would make no claim against the trust or against his brothers. And, therefore, 
the Court finds that the plaintiff is estopped from claiming an interest in any 
disbursements prior to the commencement of this litigation. 
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[R. 1092 (Trial Transcript at 417)]. 
The third and final element of equitable estoppel is that the defendant's reliance on 
the plaintiffs statement would operate to the defendant's detriment if the court allowed 
the plaintiff to contradict or repudiate his earlier statement. This is the focus of Tracy's 
challenge to the trial court's application of equitable estoppel. See Appellant's Brief at 
13-14. Tracy argues that no evidence was presented that Phillip would suffer a detriment 
due to his management and distribution of Trust assets in reliance on Tracy's statements 
(that he was renouncing his beneficial interest in the Trust and that he would not make a 
claim against the Trust) if the trial court allowed Tracy to contradict or repudiate those 
statements. See Appellant's Brief at 13-14. However, Tracy completely failed in his 
duty to marshal the evidence in this regard. 
Tracy's statements and Phillip's reasonable reliance on those statements have 
already been established, and there is at the very least a "mere scintilla of evidence" or 
"scrap" of evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom which support the trial court's 
finding that Phillip would suffer a detriment if Tracy were allowed by the trial court to 
contradict or repudiate his statements. See Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, \ 25, 112 
P.3d495. 
To begin, it is important to note that Phillip served as Trustee of the trust from its 
beginning, which included the time period within which Tracy signed the Waiver and 
Assignment, and that all actions he took in administering the Trust for those many years 
were consistent with his belief and understanding that Tracy was not a beneficiary of the 
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Trust, which only left him and Robert as beneficiaries. [R. 1092 (Trial Transcript at 
204]. Accordingly, Phillip and Robert consulted with each other regarding Trust activity, 
and Robert, who was the only other beneficiary at the time, approved of everything 
Phillip did as Trustee, including the sale of the Lehi property. [R. 1092 (Trial Transcript 
at 274-75)]. 
Specifically as one example, Phillip and Robert consulted with each other 
regarding the sale of the Lehi property, including their market research for the property, 
and the two agreed upon the ultimate price and sale of the same property. [R. 1092 (Trial 
Transcript at 275-76)]. It is axiomatic that when all beneficiaries of a trust consent to 
certain trust activity they cannot complain about it afterwards. From the evidence 
presented at trial, it is clear that Phillip acted or failed to act to his detriment in this regard 
because of Tracy's representations that he was renouncing his beneficial interest in the 
trust. Tracy tells Phillip and Robert that they can do what they want with the estate and 
that he will not pursue his claimed interest, and then sues Phillip claiming that he failed 
in his duty as Trustee. 
Also, it is undisputed that Tracy called Phillip just before his mother's death to 
inquire into and assert his interest or claim to the Trust, resulting in a dispute between the 
two. [R. 1092 (Trial Transcript 254-55)]. Shortly thereafter, and after his mother's death, 
Tracy, through his letters to Phillip and Robert, represented to Phillip that he and Robert 
could do what they wanted with the estate and that he was not going to pursue it. [R. 
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1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact ffl[ 30, 31); R. 1008 (Def. Exhibits 7, 8); Addendum 
Exhibits "E","F"]. 
Phillip testified at trial that had he not received those letters, he likely would have 
sought further legal advice because of Tracy's newly claimed interest in the Trust. [R. 
1092 (Trial Transcript at 214, 246)]. Phillip did not sell the Lehi property (the bulk of the 
Trust assets) at the price he and Robert agreed upon until after he received the letter from 
Tracy. It is unknown what an attorney would have told Phillip regarding Tracy's new 
claims to the Trust and his claim that he did not remember signing the Wavier and 
Assignment. 
Also, Tracy did not receive any distributions from the Trust. [R. 1091 (Trial 
Transcript at 87, 170)]. Phillip split the distributions from the Trust between himself and 
Robert. [R. 1091 (Trial Transcript at 172-74, 176)]. In addition, Phillip did not provide 
Tracy with an accounting for the Trust. [R. 1091 (Trial Transcript at 170)]. Furthermore, 
Phillip did not have a real property Trust asset appraised prior to selling the Trust 
property. [R. 1091 (Trial Transcript at 171)]. 
This cursory review of the evidence and all inferences which the Trial Court could 
draw therefrom supports the trial court's findings and conclusion that Phillip would suffer 
the detriment of breaching his fiduciary duty to Tracy if Tracy were now allowed to 
contradict or repudiate his prior statements, relied upon by Phillip in administering the 
Trust, that Tracy was renouncing his beneficial interest in the Trust and that he would not 
make a claim against the Trust. The implications for Phillip of breaching his fiduciary 
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duty are far more serious than just being required to disgorge something he was not 
entitled to receive as a beneficiary of the Trust. 
For example, the effect of allowing Tracy to repudiate his statements is to create 
personal liability in Phillip which is often not dischargeable in bankruptcy when based 
upon a breach of fiduciary duty. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(A)(4) (2009). Furthermore, 
trustees that have breached their fiduciary duties are subject to removal from the position 
of trustee. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-706 (2009). In fact, Tracy specifically sued to 
have Phillip removed from serving as the trustee and the appointment of Tracy as the 
successor trustee. [R. 1092 (Trial Transcript at 390)]. To breach his fiduciary duty to 
Tracy due to his reliance on Tracy's statements would have been detrimental to Phillip. 
Another inference to be drawn from the foregoing evidence supporting the trial 
court's finding that Phillip would suffer a detriment if the trial court allowed Tracy to 
repudiate his prior statements that were relied upon by Phillip in administering the Trust 
is that Phillip was forced into a position where he had to speculate as to what he would 
have done differently in administering the Trust to defend himself against Tracy's breach 
of fiduciary duty claims. 
By making statements that he was renouncing his beneficial interest in the Trust 
and that he would not make a claim against the Trust, Tracy essentially pulled the rug out 
from under Phillip with respect to Phillip's ability to defend himself against a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim. Phillip relied upon those statements and would suffer a detriment if 
the court allowed Tracy to contradict or repudiate those statements since Phillip would be 
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relegated to speculation with respect to what he would have done differently had Tracy 
not signed the Waiver and Assignment and not drafted and sent to Phillip and Robert the 
two letters in April of 2002. 
Lastly, disgorging and returning the money from the Trust distribution is not as 
simple as has been argued by Tracy. The Trust does not have the money. The monies 
were distributed to the beneficiaries, one of whom, Robert, is not a party to Tracy's 
lawsuit. 
Based in part upon the foregoing evidence and the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, which represents a scintilla of the evidence, the trial court specifically found 
that "Phillip would not have made the Trust property distributions he made or would have 
taken other measures had Tracy not signed the Waiver and Assignment and not written 
the letters and made the statements therein." [R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact ]f 34)]. 
These findings of fact led to the trial court's conclusion of law that "Phillip's reliance 
(liquidation and distribution of trust assets) on Tracy's statements would operate to 
Phillip's detriment if Tracy were allowed now to assert that he did not renounce his 
beneficial interest in the Trust." [R. 1066, 1074 (Conclusions of Law f^ 11)]. 
It is clear that Tracy failed to marshal the evidence. Moreover, the evidence 
presented herein from the record establishes that the trial court's findings of fact were not 
clearly erroneous and that it did not exceed the bounds of its significant discretion with 
respect to its legal conclusion that Phillip would suffer a detriment if Tracy were 
permitted by the trial court to assert that he did not renounce his beneficial interest in the 
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Trust prior to the filing of the Complaint. As a result, the Court should affirm the trial 
court's application of equitable estoppel to the facts of this case. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT PHILLIP DID 
NOT BREACH A FIDUCIARY DUTY OF LOYALTY TO TRACY. 
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that Phillip did not breach a fiduciary 
duty of loyalty to Tracy for two separate reasons: (1) Phillip acted reasonably in light of 
all of the facts and circumstances surrounding his administration of the Trust; and (2) 
Tracy was equitably estopped from asserting that Phillip breached a fiduciary duty to 
Tracy prior to the filing of Tracy's Complaint. 
A. Phillip Acted Reasonably in Administering the Trust. 
Tracy's sole argument in asserting that Phillip breached a fiduciary duty of loyalty 
to Tracy in making Trust distributions to himself and Robert is that Phillip: (1) 
unreasonably relied on Tracy's Waiver and Assignment; (2) unreasonably relied on the 
wishes of his deceased mother; and (3) unreasonably relied on Tracy's letters to Phillip 
and Robert. See Appellant's Brief at 9-13. However, Tracy has failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact that Phillip acted reasonably in 
relying of Tracy's Waiver and Assignment, the wishes of his deceased mother, and 
Tracy's letters to Phillip and Robert. Specifically, the trial court made the following 
findings of fact: 
After Barbara's death and the receipt of Tracy's letter dated April 7, 2002, Phillip 
liquidated or sold some real property and distributed those proceeds and a few 
other Trust assets equally between himself and Robert under the reasonable belief 
that he and Robert were the only beneficiaries of the Trust in reasonable reliance 
upon the Waiver and Assignment as well as Tracy's letters stating that Phillip 
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and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the estate and that Tracy wasn't 
going to anything about it. 
[R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact Tl 33)]. 
Phillip reasonably understood that his mother, Barbara, was to be the sole 
owner and/or beneficiary of all of the Trust assets and as such could control 
them. 
[R. 1066, 1068 (Findings of Fact If 9)]. 
These findings of fact, in conjunction with the trial court's other findings, formed 
the basis for the trial court's conclusion of law that Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty 
of loyalty to Tracy. [R. 1066, 1074 (Conclusions of Law If 12)]. To challenge that 
conclusion of law, Tracy is required to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings of fact. As already noted, 
If the application of the standard is extremely fact sensitive, then the reviewing 
court should generally give the trial court considerable discretion in determining 
whether the facts of a particular case come within the established rule of law. 
Even where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal ruling, as here, if a 
determination of the correctness of a courts' application of a legal standard is 
extremely fact-sensitive, the defendants also have a duty to marshal the evidence. 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 20, 100 P.3d 1177 (internal citations omitted). 
The issue of whether Phillip breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy "is a 
mixed question of law and fact" for which the trial court is afforded "ample discretion." 
Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, If 10, 155 P.3d 917. In this case, whether Phillip 
breached his fiduciary duty to Tracy is extremely fact-sensitive as evidenced by the trial 
court's findings of fact and the evidence presented over two days of trial to support those 
findings of fact. [R. 1066-76; 1091-92 (Trial Transcripts)]. Consequently, Tracy's 
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failure to challenge the trial court's findings of fact by marshalling the evidence and 
arguing that they were clearly erroneous is fatal to Tracy's legal argument that Phillip 
breached a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy. 
Furthermore, the Court cannot rely on a few out-of-context facts from the record 
in evaluating whether the trial court exceeded its "ample discretion" in concluding as a 
matter of law that Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy. Indeed, the 
Court must consider all of the facts and circumstances surrounding Phillip's 
administration of the Trust. Since Tracy has not argued that the trial court's findings of 
fact were clearly erroneous (or marshaled the evidence as would be required to make 
such an argument), references shall be made hereafter to findings of fact instead of to the 
record inasmuch as "it is presumed the findings of fact of the trial court are supported by 
evidence." See Clark v. Jennings, 98 P.2d 348, 348 (Utah 1940). 
On September 13, 1989, a Trust Agreement drafted by attorney Dale M. Dorius 
was executed by Don and Barbara, as husband and wife, for the purpose of creating a 
Trust. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of 
Fact fflf 1,2)]. The Trust Agreement provided that Phillip, Robert, and Tracy were 
beneficiaries of the Trust. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"; R. 1066, 
1067 (Findings of Fact ]f 3)]. Robert is Barbara's son from a previous marriage, Tracy is 
Don's son from a previous marriage, and Phillip is the son of both Don and Barbara. [R. 
1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact \ 4)]. 
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The Trust Agreement provided for Phillip to serve as the Trustee of the Trust. [R. 
1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact 1j 5)]. As 
Trustee, Phillip was to disburse to Don and Barbara "such amounts from the principal or 
income of the Trust Estate as they shall from time to time direct" during their lifetimes. 
[R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 1); Addendum Exhibit "A"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact ^ 6)]. 
However, Don and Barbara's marriage was dissolved by a Decree of Divorce 
issued by Judge Gunnell on November 4, 1991. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 3); Addendum 
Exhibit "B"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact ^ 7)]. This Decree of Divorce mandated 
that Barbara was to be the sole beneficiary of the Trust and directed "the Trustee, Phillip 
D. Southwick, to do whatever is necessary to . . . make Barbara P. Southwick the sole 
beneficiary of the assets in the trust as her sole and separate property." [R. 1008 (Def. 
Exhibit 3); Addendum Exhibit "B"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact H 8)]. 
Phillip was aware of the divorce proceedings while they were pending and was 
aware of the result of the divorce at the time it was issued and relied upon the Decree of 
Divorce in performing his duties as Trustee of the Trust going forward. [R. 1066, 1068 
(Findings of Fact ^ 9)]. Specifically, Phillip reasonably understood that his mother, 
Barbara, was to be the sole owner and/or beneficiary of all of the Trust assets and as such 
could control them. [R. 1066, 1068 (Findings of Fact f 9)]. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, 
When the court has cognizance of the controversy, as it appears from the 
pleadings, and has the parties before it, then the judgment or order, which is 
authorized by the pleadings, however, erroneous, irregular or informal it may be, 
is valid until set aside or reversed upon appeal or writ of error. This doctrine is 
37 
founded upon reason and the 'soundest principles of public policy.'" Kramer v. 
Pixton, 268 P. 1029, 1034 (Utah 1928). Furthermore, the Uniform Law Comments 
to Utah Code § 75-7-1006 establishes that "a trustee's reliance on the trust 
instrument would not be justified if the trustee is aware of a prior court decree . . . 
changing the terms of the trust." 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-1006 (2009) (Uniform Law Comments). 
Accordingly, it would have been entirely unreasonable for Phillip to disregard the 
Decree of Divorce and its effect on Tracy's beneficial interest in administering the Trust. 
Consistent with the Decree of Divorce, Don and Barbara signed a document referred to 
herein as the Joint Release that directed Phillip "to convey and transfer all of the assets 
located in [the Trust] to Barbara P. Southwick as the sole beneficiary under the terms of 
said Trust Agreement." [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 5); Addendum Exhibit "C": R. 1066, 
1068 (Findings of Fact ]flj 10,11)]. Barbara delivered, and Phillip approved and accepted 
into the Trust, the signed Joint Release on or about December 12, 1991. [R. 1066, 1068 
(Findings ofFacttH 12,13)]. 
On January 31, 1992, Tracy signed a document which had been prepared by 
attorney Dale M. Dorius which is referred to herein as the Waiver and Assignment. In 
signing the Waiver and Assignment, Tracy purported to renounce "any claim he may 
have in any of the Trust Estate including income and/or principal, all cash including bank 
accounts, and all proceeds from life insurance policies and further[] said Trustee to 
distribute his share of the Trust Estate to PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK." [R. 1008 (Def. 
Exhibit 6); Addendum Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fad f 16)]. Barbara 
delivered the Waiver and Assignment to Phillip, who as Trustee approved and accepted 
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the Waiver and Assignment into the Trust on March 12, 1992. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 6); 
Addendum Exhibit "D"; R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact If 17)]. 
At that time, Phillip knew that attorney Dale Dorius had prepared the Trust and 
other Trust documents, had advised Don and Barbara off and on regarding the Trust, and 
had prepared the Waiver and Assignment. [R. 1066, 1069 (Findings of Fact % 17)]. 
Furthermore, Phillip knew that a Decree of Divorce had been issued mandating that 
Phillip do whatever is necessary to . . . make Barbara P. Southwick the sole beneficiary of 
the assets in the trust as her sole and separate property." [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 3); 
Addendum Exhibit "B"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact 1j 8)]. 
Based upon these facts and circumstances, it was entirely reasonable for Phillip to 
accept Tracy's Waiver and Assignment and to conclude that Tracy was no longer a 
beneficiary of the Trust and should not receive distributions from the Trust. In asserting 
that it was unreasonable for Phillip to rely on the Waiver and Assignment, Tracy makes 
the following arguments: (1) the Trust Agreement prohibited any assignment of any 
interest in the Trust by a beneficiary such as Tracy pursuant to its spendthrift provision; 
(2) Phillip did not contact Tracy to confirm whether or not Tracy desired to disclaim his 
interest in the Trust; (3) Tracy denied signing the Wavier and Assignment in the summer 
of 2001; and (4) the trial court concluded that the Waiver and Assignment did not comply 
with the statutory requirements for a disclaimer. See Appellee's Brief at 10, 12. 
These arguments as to why Phillip's reliance on the Wavier and Assignment was 
unreasonable are without merit. First, Utah's Disclaimer Statute provided that "[t]he 
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right to disclaim [a beneficial interest in a tmst] exists notwithstanding any limitation on 
the interest of the disclaimant in the nature of a spendthrift provision or similar 
restriction." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802 (1991). Furthermore, at that time the 
spendthrift provision of the Trust was subordinate to the Decree of Divorce. As already 
noted, it would have been unreasonable for Phillip to disregard the Decree of Divorce and 
its effect on Tracy's beneficial interest in administering the Trust. 
In addition, a spendthrift provision is intended to guard the interest of the 
beneficiaries and the trust corpus from creditors and other third parties so as to not 
jeopardize the trust assets. Its purpose is not to prevent a beneficiary from transferring 
his beneficial interest to the trustee in order to disclaim his interest in the Trust. 
Second, Phillip did not act unreasonably by not contacting Tracy to confirm 
whether or not Tracy desired to disclaim his interest in the Trust upon receiving the 
Waiver and Assignment from Barbara in light of the existence of the Decree of Divorce 
and its mandate that Phillip take the steps necessary to make Barbara the sole beneficiary 
of the Trust. 
Third, the trial court specifically found that Tracy's testimony that he did not sign 
the Wavier and Assignment was "unconvincing and appeared to be for the purposes of 
this litigation rather than from knowledge or remembrance." [R. 1066, 1073 
(Conclusions of Law ^ 7).] With the trial court's finding concerning Tracy's credibility 
in mind, it was not unreasonable for Phillip, receiving a call from Tracy ten years after 
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the entry of the Decree of Divorce and the signing of the Waiver and Assignment, to have 
questioned Tracy's newfound assertion that he did not sign the Wavier and Assignment. 
Finally, Phillip did not have the benefit of the trial court's conclusion that the 
Waiver and Assignment did not comply with the statutory requirements for a disclaimer 
until after the bench trial in this matter. Taking into account that the Decree of Divorce 
was issued by a judge and that Tracy's Waiver and Assignment was prepared by an 
attorney, it was not unreasonable for Phillip to proceed on the basis that the Tracy's 
Waiver and Assignment was valid and enforceable for purposes of complying with the 
directive given to Phillip in the Decree of Divorce to take the steps necessary to make 
Barbara the sole beneficiary of the Trust. 
Phillip believed that the Decree of Divorce was a valid directive requiring that 
Barbara become the sole Trustor and sole Beneficiary of the Trust, and that as a result she 
was free to modify and/or terminate the Trust and/or control the property at her 
discretion. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact U 24)]. Thereafter, Barbara told Phillip that 
she planned and intended to carry on with the Trust, since Don and Tracy were no longer 
beneficiaries, in order to avoid potential federal tax consequences associated with having 
all of the Trust property transferred to her individually and to avoid the inconvenience 
and cost of setting up a new trust. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact j^ 25)]. She also told 
Phillip that it was her intent and desire that Robert and Phillip receive the trust property 
upon her death and that accordingly they remain as beneficiaries of the Trust and that the 
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property would be evenly split between Phillip and Robert upon her death. [R. 1066, 
1070 (Findings of Fact 126)]. 
For these reasons, Phillip reasonably believed it unnecessary to transfer all of the 
Trust property from a trust which purportedly no longer named Don or Tracy as 
beneficiaries into a second trust of the same status. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact ^ 
27)]. As a result of Barbara's expression of her plans and intent, Phillip and Robert did 
not ever purport to renounce their interests in the Trust, nor were they asked to renounce 
their interest in the Trust. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fact If 28)]. 
In asserting that Phillip breached his duty of loyalty to Tracy when he made 
distributions from the Trust to himself and P^obert, Tracy argues that it was unreasonable 
for Phillip to rely on the wishes of his deceased mother. This argument ignores the 
reality of the Decree of Divorce and its mandate that Phillip take the steps necessary to 
make Barbara the sole beneficiary of the Trust. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 3); Addendum 
Exhibit "B"]. Since it was reasonable for Phillip to administer the Trust as if Barbara 
was the sole trustor and beneficiary of the Trust—it would have been unreasonable for 
Phillip to ignore the Decree of Divorce—it was also reasonable for Phillip to rely on 
Barbara's wishes, including her wishes that upon her death Robert and Phillip become the 
only beneficiaries of the Trust, pursuant to the reasonable belief that she had absolute 
power to modify the Trust. 
Barbara died in February of 2002. [R. 1066, 1070 (Findings of Fad If 29)]. In a 
letter addressed to and received by Phillip dated April 7, 2002, which was drafted over 
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ten years after Tracy signed the Waiver and Assignment, Tracy wrote that he did not 
remember whether or not he signed the Waiver and Assignment, that he was not going to 
do anything about the Trust, and that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they wanted 
with the Trust assets. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 7); Addendum Exhibit "E"; R. 1066, 1070 
(Findings of Fact ]f 30)]. In a letter addressed to and received by Robert dated April 20, 
2002, Tracy again wrote that he did not remember whether or not he signed the Waiver 
and Assignment, that he was not going to do anything about the Trust, and that Phillip 
and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the Trust assets. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 
8); Addendum Exhibit "F"; R. 1066, 1071 (Findings of Fact 131)]. 
Tracy also argues that it was unreasonable for Phillip to rely on Tracy's letters 
when he made distributions from the Trust to himself and Robert. According to the trial 
court, "Tracy's letters to Phillip and Robert in April 2002, at least six separate times in 
those two letters, say that Tracy will not assert a claim. They say it in several ways, but 
they say it at least six times in the two letters." [R. 1091 (Trial Transcript at 417 (Trial 
Court's Ruling))]. 
If Tracy believed that he still was a beneficiary of the Trust, it was unreasonable 
for Tracy to draft two letters stating that he did not remember whether or not he signed 
the Waiver and Assignment, that he was not going to do anything about the Trust, and 
that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the Trust assets. When Tracy 
drafted the letters to Phillip and Robert, ten years had passed and the Decree of Divorce 
had not been declared invalid and Tracy's Waiver and Assignment had not been declared 
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ineffective. As a result, it was reasonable for Phillip to rely on Tracy's letters in 
determining that it was proper to make distributions from the Trust to himself and Robert. 
Tracy's final argument in support of his assertion that Phillip breached a fiduciary 
duty of loyalty to Tracy is that Phillip failed to prudently administer the Trust. See 
Appellant's Brief at 12. In support of this argument, Tracy asserts that "[pjrudence 
requires that Phillip should have sought a determination by the court as to Tracy's status 
as a beneficiary." See id. This assertion ignores the fact that a court had already passed 
judgment on Tracy's status as a beneficiary of the Trust by mandating that Phillip take 
whatever actions were necessary to divest Tracy of his status as a beneficiary of the 
Trust. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit 3); Addendum Exhibit "B"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of 
Fact If 8)]. 
Phillip's actions in administering the Trust were consistent with the Decree of 
Divorce, the Joint Release, the Waiver and Assignment, the representations he received 
from Barbara, and the letters drafted by Tracy in April of 2002. In light of the foregoing 
facts and the attendant circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its ample discretion in 
concluding that Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy in 
administering the Trust. 
B. Tracy is Estopped from Asserting that Phillip Breached a Fiduciary Duty. 
In asserting that Phillip breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy by making 
distributions from the Trust to Phillip and Robert, Tracy did not address the trial court's 
conclusion of law that Tracy is "estopped from making any claims against the Trust or 
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Phillip individually or as Trustee related to Trust distributions or management prior to the 
filling of the Complaint." [R. 1066, 1074 (Conclusions of Law 114)]. Having failed to 
challenge this conclusion of law or the findings of fact in support thereof, the Court 
should affirm the trial court's application of equitable estoppel to the issue of whether 
Phillip breached a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy by making distributions from the 
Trust to Phillip and Robert prior to the filing of Tracy's Complaint. 
IV. AFFIRMATION ON OTHER GROUNDS. 
The Utah Supreme Court articulated the standard whereby a judgment may be 
affirmed on alternative grounds as follows: 
It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if 
it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though 
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of 
its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged 
or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not 
considered or passed on by the lower court. 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ]fl0, 52 P.3d 1158 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). In this case, the trial court's judgment—that Tracy is a beneficiary of the Trust 
but that he is not entitled to claim an interest in pre-Complaint distributions or to assert 
that Phillip breached his fiduciary duties—should be affirmed since Phillip was required 
to act pursuant to the directive given to Phillip by the Decree of Divorce issued by Judge 
Gunnell on November 4, 1991. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit \ 3); Addendum Exhibit "B"; R. 
1066, 1067 (Findings of Fact If 8)]. 
When the court has cognizance of the controversy, as it appears from the 
pleadings, and has the parties before it, then the judgment or order, which is 
authorized by the pleadings, however, erroneous, irregular or informal it may be, 
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is valid until set aside or reversed upon appeal or writ of error. This doctrine is 
founded upon reason and the 'soundest principles of public policy.' 
Kramer v. Pixton, 268 P. 1029, 1034 (Utah 1928). Furthermore, the Uniform Law 
Comments to Utah Code § 75-7-1006 establishes that "a trustee's reliance on the trust 
instrument would not be justified if the trustee is aware of a prior court decree . . . 
changing the terms of the trust." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-1006 (2009) (Uniform 
Law Comments). 
The Decree of Divorce mandated that Barbara was to be the sole beneficiary of the 
Trust. [R. 1008 (Def. Exhibit % 3); Addendum Exhibit "B"; R. 1066, 1067 (Findings of 
Fact TJ 8)]. This mandate superseded the terms of the Trust and was legitimately relied 
upon by Phillip in administering the Trust until the trial court in this case held that the 
Decree of Divorce did not operate to terminate Tracy's beneficial interest in the Trust. 
[R. 517-23 (Memorandum Decision)]. As a result, Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty 
to Tracy by administering the Trust as though Tracy were not a beneficiary since Phillip 
could not justifiably disregard the Decree of Divorce. Furthermore, Tracy should not be 
entitled to assert that he was a beneficiary of the Trust prior to the filing of the Complaint 
in this matter since the Decree of Divorce was valid until it was set aside by the trial court 
after the filing of the Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Phillip respectfully requests that the Court conclude 
that Tracy's status as a beneficiary of the Trust was terminated by virtue of his execution 
of the Waiver and Assignment and/or the letters Tracy sent to Phillip and Robert. In the 
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alternative, Phillip respectfully requests that the Court: (1) affirm the trial court's 
conclusion that Phillip did not breach a fiduciary duty to Tracy; and (2) find that the trial 
court's conclusion that Phillip suffered a detriment by relying on Tracy's statements was 
supported by evidence. 
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Tab A 
TRUST AGREEMENT 
DON B. SOUTHWICK and BARBARA P. SOUTHWICK of 911 North 
Tiemont Street, Tremonton, Box Elder County, Utah, hereinafter 
referred to as the Trustors, hereby transfer and assign in 'filia-
te PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK of 1150 S. 660 W., Tremonton, Utah 
84337, hereinafter referred to as the Trustee, the ptop<-uLy 
described in Schedule "A" attached hereto. 
All property now or hereafter subject to the provisions of 
this instrument shall be held, managed and distill; ;tc:! -"-
hereinafter provided. 
ARTICLE I 
Distribution 
1. Lifetime of Trustors> During the lifetime of th" 
Trustors, the Trustee shalL-pay to the Trustors, for their 
benefit, such amounts from the principal or income of ihe Tiust 
Estate as they shall from time to time direct. 
2. Incapacity of Trustors. In the event the Trusters shall 
become physically or mentally incapacitated to an exl'Mit tlui 
they cannot conveniently attend to their own affairs, TL list*?" 
shall pay to them or apply for their benefit, such rums; from 
income or principal as he shall determine in his sole <l Lscrnt irn 
is necessary or desirable to provide for Trustors1 care, suppor ' , 
and maintenance. 
3. Death of Trustors. Upon the death of the Trustors, MK> 
Trustee shall pay out of the income and/or principal of lh~ itu',1 
Estate the expenses of the last illness and funeral, of i hr 
Trustors and any debts of the Trustors to the extent that oth'M 
provisions shall not have been made for the payment of such 
expenses or debts. 
4. Distribution After Payment of Debts. Upon the death of 
the Trustorsf the Trustee, after payment of all expenses o£ last 
illness and funeral of the Trustors and any debts of tho 
Trustors, shall distribute the balance of the Trust Estate 
including income and/or principal, all cash including ban): 
accounts, and all proceeds from life insurance policies *o 
Trustors1 sons, PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK of 1150 S. 660 W. , 
Tremonton, Utah 84337, ROBERT S. MILNER of 810 Cottonwood Drive, 
South Weber-, Utah 84405, and TRACY L. SOUTHWICK of 150 Jor' ««•/ 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
In the event Trustors1 said children should predecease • h° 
Trustors or die prior tp the distribution of the Trunt propyl1-:, 
leaving issue surviving them, their share in the Trust \\r.* m *• 
shall go to their lawful issue by right of representation. 
ARTICLE II 
Rights Reserved by Trustors 
1« Neither the Trustors or any person on b^ haif-. 
Trustors, may alter, amend or revoke this Trust in y^ hoic en 
part during the lifetime of the Trustors, during incompetency 
the Trustors, or after the death of the Trustors. 
2. Adding to Trust. The Trustors at any time, or from tim" 
to time, or by testamentary disposition may add to this TruM 
other property which, when accepted by the Trustee, shall become 
a part of the Trust Estate to be held in trust under the teunr; 
and provisions of this Agreement. 
3# Restrictions on Sale and Reinvestment. l'urluq tlr* 
lifetime of the Trustors, the Trustee shall make no sale or o\•In-
disposition of any property of the Trust Estate and make no 
investment of any money held in the said Ttust Estate except m 
shall be designated in writing by the Trustors. Fi.ovid'vl, 
however, that in the event of the incompetency of the Trustors, 
this paragraph shall not apply and the Trustee shall exorcise h.is 
discretion without the written consent of the Trustors. 
ARTICLE III 
Powers of the Trustee 
To carry out the purposes of this Trust and subject to any 
limitations stated elsewhere in this instrument, the .Trustee 
shall have all the powers presently granted to Trustees under the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated 75-7-402, in addition to any 
powers hereafter conferred by law and including the following 
powers: 
1. Limitation on Investments. To invest the Trust Estate 
only in secured savings accounts and/or certificates of deposit 
in banks or savings and loan associations in which the deposits 
are insured by the Federal Goverrunent unless otherwise authorized 
by the Trustors• 
2« Payment of Expenses. To pay taxes, assessments and all 
other expenses incurred in the administration of the Trust Estate 
and the protection thereof against legal or equitable attack, 
including counsel fees and reasonable compensation for his ov/n 
services* 
3. Determination of Principal and Income. To determine 
what is principal and income of the Trust Estate and 'ipportion 
and allocate, in his discretion, receipts and disbursements as 
between these accounts except insofar as the Trustee shall 
exercise the discretion herein conferred, and except as otherwise 
provided in this instrument, matters relating to principal and 
income shall be governed by the provisions of the Utah Unifmm 
Principal and Income Act from time to time existing. 
4. No Bond Required* No Trustee or successor Trust'™, 
hereunder, shall be required to give any bond or other security 
for the faithful performance of their duties, powers nn'1 
discretions. 
ARTICLE IV 
General Provisions 
1. Accrual of Income and Proration of Expenses. iw-'w* 
accrued or unpaid on trust property when received in'o the Tmrt-
shall be treated as any other income. Income accrued or h"M 
undistributed by the Trustee at the termination of any intere f 
or estate under this Trust shall go to the beneficiaries n?::t 
entitled to the next eventual interest in the proportions in 
which they take such Interest. 
5. Spendthrift Provision* Each and every beneficialy under 
this Trust is hereby restrained from, and are and shall be 
without right, power or authority to sell, transfer, mortgage, 
pledge, hypothecate, anticipate or in any other manner effect or 
impair his, her, or their beneficial or legal rights, titles, 
interests, claims, and estates in and to the income and/or 
principal of this Trust during the entire term, hereof; nor shall 
the rights, titles, interests, claims, or estates of any such 
beneficiary be subject to the rights or claims of creditors nor 
subject nor liable to the process of law or court* 
6. Designation of Trustee. It is understood and agreed 
that said PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK shall act as Trustee so long a* he 
is living and competent- In the event of the death or 
incompetency of said PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK, ROBERT S. flEl.liRR of 
810 Cottonwood Drive, South Webet, Utah 84405 and TRACY I,. 
SOUTHWICK of 150 Jeremy Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, shaJJ h-
appointed as successor Co-Trustees by a court of compel°ni 
jurisdiction. 
7• Trustee Entitled to Expenses and Compensation. 'ih" 
Trustee shall be entitled to reasonable expenses and xeasonnM^ 
compensation for services performed as Trustee, to be paid f?"m 
the Trust Estate. 
8
* Definitions. The words "child", "children" and ni^u-M 
as used herein, shall include legally adopted children. Thn word 
"issue" shall also include lineal descendants indefinitely. 
The words "Trustee or Trustees" are used interclmngabJy and 
PsnnnnnK 
mean an original Trustee or Trustees and any successor 01; nddo<! 
Trustee or Trustees. 
9. Separability of Trust Provisions. If any provision of 
this Agreement is unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall 
nevertheless be carried into effect. 
10* Law Governing Trust. This Trust has been accepted by 
the Trustee in the State of Utah; and unless otherwise, provided 
in this instrument, its validity, construction and all rights 
under it shall be governed by the laws of that state. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said, DON B. SOUTHWICK and BARBARA 
P. SOUTHWICK, have executed this Agreement in duplicate this 
\ ^ y day of ^ Tjpr r 1989 at \ C^AVIM-VCT(\_ , Utah. 
^ N % ^pJvwvAl^ 
Signed in the presence of! DON B. SOUTHWIClT 
<v^ •"") <~^ ) Trustor 
- £ " (.>;-
/ / / /y f . -/' •./ 
BARBARA P. SOUTHWICK 
Trustor 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
j eg 
COUNTY OF Yutt f k r ) 
On the \1by day of c-<\,(S\r , 1989, personally app'.v-u~'l 
before me DON B. SOUTHWICK and BARBARA P. SOUTHWICK, the .'J.Ujri'M X 
Donnnnn-7 
of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. 
(•/{ ccv::?5Rn \ r . r 
SUSAII R. FUGS'IY 
-.-A ;*IM';M.".I /1.-7J 
c^NOTARy PUBLIC 
s (\v.viii ,. 
n:vo*uwi 'W/*';ff 
^ " g ^ g ^ f t Expires: 
Residing at W - ; ^ . ^ - ^ , \ \ \ -
Psnnnnna 
SCHEDULE "A" 
ATTACHED TO THE SOUTHWICK FAMILY TRUST 
Dated September 13r 1989 
1. 11.93 Acres farm land located in Lehi, Utah County, Utah and 
more particulary described as follows: 
Commencing at a point 13 chains West and 4.54 chains South 
of the Northeast corner of the Southeast quarter of Section 
20, Township 5 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence East 5.75 chains; thence South 20.75 
chains; thence West 5.75 chains; thence North 20.75 chains 
to the point of beginning. 
Together with six (6) shares of the Capital Stock of the 
Spring Creek Irrigation Company. 
2. 26 acres zange land located in Utah County, Utah and more 
particularly described as follows: 
The North 26 acres of the East Half of the Southeast quarter 
of Section 13, Township 5 South, Range 3 West of the Salt 
Lake Base and Meridan. 
3. 80 acres range land located in Utah County, Utah and more 
particularly described as follows: 
NW1/4 of NW1/4 of Sec. 21, T. 4 S., R. 3 W., SLM; & SW1/4 
of NW1/4 of Sec. 21, T. 4 S., R. 3 W., SLM. Area 80 acres. 
4. Residence located at 911 North Tremont, Tremonton, Box Elder 
County, Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
Lot 16, Block 2, Amended Plat W, Tremonton Townsite Survey, 
Box Elder County, Utah, according to the official plat 
thereof. 
Subject to any taxes or assessments now or hereafter levied 
by any taxing unit. 
SUBJECT TO a first mortgage to the First Security Bank of 
Utah, National Association for $14,650.00 dated October 3, 
1961 in the office of the County Recorder of Box Elder 
County, Utah October 9, 1961 in Book 153 of Mortgage Records 
at Page 110, which mortgage the grantees agree to assume and 
pay in accordance with the terms thereof. 
5. 11.5 acres farm land and minor subdivision at Tremonton, Box 
Elder County, Utah and more particularly described as 
follows: 
9 
Beginning at a point on the North right of way line of a 
frontage road 1045.3 feet East along the section line and 
284.2 feet North of the S.W. Corner of Section 10, T. 11 N. , 
R. 3 W,, SLB&M said point being on the grantor's East line, 
and running North 57* 31f 30" West along said frontage road 
line 530.9 feet; thence Northwesterly 235.6 feet along the 
arc of a 539.96 foot radius curve to the right along said 
line; thence North 32* 31f 30" West 38.0 feet along said 
line; thence North 306.0 feet; thence North 1* 44? West 
226.0 feet; thence North 87* 15f East 607.5 feet; thence 
South 1* 44f East 1047.3 feet to the point of beginning, 
containing 11.50 acres. 
There are four (4) lots along the bottom of the above 11.50 
acres more particularly described as follows: 
LOT 1 
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road 
1045.3 feet East along the Section line and 284.2 feet North 
from the S.W. Corner of Section 10, T. 11 N., R. 3 W., SLB&M 
and running N 57*31'30" W alona said line 168.37 feet; 
thence N 10*00'00" E."381.93 feet; thence 575*00'00" E 63.40 
feet; thence S 1*44' E 450.00 feet to the point of 
beginning, containing 1.00 acre, reserving an easement for a 
drainage ditch 10 feet wide along the East side. 
LOT 2 
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road 
1045.3 feet East along the Section line and thence North 
284.2 feet and thence N 57*31'30" W 168.37 feet from the 
S.W. Corner of Section 10, T. 11 N., R. 3 W., SLB&M to the 
true point of beginning and running N 57*31'30" W along said 
line 134.10 feet; thence N 10*00'00" E 321.38 feet; thence S 
84*17'00" E 124.26 feet; thence S 10*00'00" W 381.93 feet to 
the point of beginning, containing 1.00 acre. 
LOT 2 
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road 
1045.3 feet East along the Section line and thence North 
284.2 feet and thence N 57*31'30" W 302.47 feet from the 
S.W. corner of Section 10, T. 11 N., R. 3 W., SLB&M to the 
true point of beginning and running N 57*31'30" W 125.00 
feet; thence 40.16 feet along a curve to the right of 40.0 
foot radius (Note: Chord to said curve bears N 28*45'45" W 
38.50 feet) thence North 213.00 feet; thence East 179.78 
feet; thence S 10*00'00" W 321.38 feet to the point of 
beginning, containing 0.99 acre. 
10 
LOT 1 
Beginning at a point on the North line of a Frontage Road 
1045.3 feet East along the Section line and thence North 
284.2 feet and thence N 57*31f30" W 530.9 feet and thence N 
56*20' W 72.0 feet from the S.W. Corner of Section 10, T. 
11 N. , R. 3 W., SLB&M to the true point of beginning and 
running 167.82 feet along a 539.96 foot radius curve to the 
right; (Note: Chord to said curve bears N 42*56'15" W 
167.15 feet) thence N 32*31f30" W 38.0 feet; thence North 
107.75 feet; thence East 200.00 feet; thence South 231.52 
feet; thence 90.76 feet along a 40.0 foot radius curve to 
the right to the point of beginning, containing 1.00 acre. 
r? 6. All that part beginning at a point on West right of way line 
,9^ of County Road and the North right of way line of Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Co. West Canal, which point is 1095 feet North, 33 
feet West of Southeast Corner of Northeast Quarter of 
Section 1, Township 11 North, Range 4 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, and running thence North 85* 25f West 188 feet 
along the Canal right of way, thence North 460.9 feet, 
thence North 86* 00T East 188 feet to the County Road right 
o£ way line, thence South along said line to the point of 
beginning. EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE FOLLOWING: 
Beginning at a point on the West right of way line of the 
County Road and the North right of way line of the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Co. West Canal, which point is 1095 feet North, 
33 feet West of the Southeast corner of the Northeast 
Quarter of said Section 1, thence North 85* 25' West 188 
feet along the Canal right of way, thence North 257.9 feet, 
thence North 86* 00' East 188 feet to the County Road right 
of way line, thence South along said line to the point of 
beginning. 
> M / 7 . Lot 47, Block 4, Beginning N. 0' and W. 8f of the S.E. Corner, 
L> thence W. 16', thence N. 3 1/2', thence E. 16', thence S. 
3 1/2' to P.O.B. 2 spaces, incl. P.M. in the Provo City 
Cemetery. 
$ ,>^-8. Lot 1, Block 12, in the Lehi City Cemetery. 
Remaining interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
between Don B. Southwick & Barbara P. Southwick, husband and 
wife, as the Sellers, and Ed Muir & Lorraine Muir, his wife, 
as the Buyers, dated March 1, 1979, marked Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto. Including a 1958 house trailer, Make -
Vendale, Identification Number V-2906Y102. One used 
electric range. One 105,000 BTU gas furnace. Escrow is 
being held by Brigham Realty Inc. at 83 S. Main, Brigham 
City, Utah. 
11 
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1972 Ideal house trailer, S/N 1S3325 
1975 GMC 1-ton farm truck, Model C35C35, VIN YCY335Z501303 
1979 Luv pickup truck, VIN CRN1498285318 
1987 Century Buick Sedan automobile, 1G4AL51WXH6418162 
1972 two-horse trailer, Make - ROC, I.D. 710156HT 
John Deere Model "A" tractor, S/N 631171, approx. 45 years 
old 
John Deere Model "A" tractor, S/N 574169, approx. 55 years 
old 
24 shares of capital stock in the Lehi Spring Creek 
Irrigation Company, Lehi, Utah. No. 30 
20.80 shares in Bear River Water Distribution Company, 
Tremonton, Utah. No. 3589 
85 shares in The Western States Machine Company. No. 1754 
Guns: 
300 Savage, S/N 558898 
300 Savage, S/N 397006 w/t scope 
308 Savage, S/N 1085641 w/t scope 
Remington 12 gauge, Model 870, S/N 394415V 
Marlin 22 rifle, Model 39-A 
Sharps rifle, 50 calibre, S/N C23407 (1948) 
Ruger pistol, 357 Mag., S/N 157-86346 
S&W 22 calibre pistol, S/N 116056 
S&W 357 Mag. calibre, Mod. 27-2, S/N N327396 
20 gauge Ranger shotgun, S/N 105-21 
22 rifle, Steven Model 56 
410 gauge shotgun, Stevens Model 59A 
12 gauge shotgun, Remington Model 10A 
2 saddles made by Utahn Saddle Co., approx. 10 - 12 yrs. old 
1 youth saddle 
1 pack saddle 
2 each bridles, halters, ropes, chaps, and saddle bags 
Electric welder made by Forney and accessories 
Hand tools and wrenches 
1966 Metro truck, Model 1200, S/N 551211L006182 
12 
1 buckskin mare, born 1971, Lady Bar Deck 71, #887509 
1 black gelding, born 1975, Little Tomm Hawk, #1122182 
1 bay mare 
1 yearling buckskin gelding, born August 1988 
All cattle with Rafter S on left hip thigh. Brand and ear 
mark are registered to Don B. Southwick 
Bank Accounts: 
Logan Savings & Loan: #0303 60073915 
Logan Savings & Loan: #0203 60083711 
Sandia Federal Savings & Loan: #064 7010568 
Sandia Federal Savings & Loan: #061 3205050 
13 
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PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337 
VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT 
Attorney for Defendant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON B. SOUTHWICK, / 
Plaintiff, / DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. / 
BARBARA P. SOUTHWICK, / Civil No. 9Q00QQ252DA 
Defendant. / Judge F. L. Gunnell 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on 
the 18th-day of October, 1991, before the Honorable F. L. 
Gunnell, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court, 
sitting without a jury, and the Plaintiff not appearing 
in person, nor with his attorney, and the Defendant 
appearing in person and with her attorney, Pete N. 
Vlahos, and Plaintiff's attorney having withdrawn as 
attorney for the Plaintiff by written Motion and Order 
and said Motion and Order was filed in open Court by the 
Defendant's attorney, and it having been shown to the 
Court that the Defendant was duly served with a copy of 
the Complaint and a copy of the Summons, and wherein the 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 1 
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SOUTHWICK VS. SOUTHWICK 
Civil No.: 900000252DA 
Defendant having answered same within the time allotted 
by statute, and wherein the Stipulation of the parties 
herein settling all of their property rights, alimony, 
support, attorney fees, Court costs and other kindred 
matters, and more than three (3) months having elapsed 
from the date of the filing of the Complaint, and the 
testimony of the Defendant having been heard in open 
Court, and the Court having been fully informed in the 
premises, and having made its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, separately stated in writing, NOW 
THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Defendant, Barbara P. Southwick, is granted a Decree of 
Divorce from the Plaintiff, Don B'. Southwick, same to 
become final upon the signing and entry. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
said Decree of Divorce shall incorporate herein all 
matters of property rights, alimony, support, attorney 
fees, Court costs and other kindred matters that are 
contained in the Stipulation and Agreement of the parties 
herein and same is set forth as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff and Defendant shall direct 
the Trustee, Phillip D. Southwick, who resides at 1150 
South 660 West in Tremonton, Utah, to convey the 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 2 
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SOUTHWICK VS. SOUTHWICK 
Civil No.: 900000252DA 
necessary documents that will convey all of the property 
presently in said trust to the Defendant, and that the 
Defendant shall be the recipient and the sole beneficiary 
under the Trust Agreement, and that the Plaintiff shall 
have no further right or claim as a beneficiary in the 
assets that have been placed in said Trust Agreement. 
2. That both parties jointly shall give written 
notice to the Trustee, Phillip D. Southwick, to do 
whatever is np.nessary to remove the Plaintiff. Don B. 
Southwick, as a beneficiary under the Trust Agreement and 
make Barbara P. Southwick the sole beneficiary of the 
assets in the trust as her sole and separate property. 
3. That the Plaintiff specifically acknowledges 
that the Defendant shall receive the following real" and 
personal property that is presently in the Trust 
Agreement as the sole beneficiary, and does convey all of 
his right, title and interest in and to the trust assets 
and waives any claim as a beneficiary thereunder. 
4. That said Trust Agreement includes the following 
real property, to-wit: 
(a) 11.93 acres of land, with 24 shares of 
irrigation water located in Lehi, Utah. 
(b) 80 acres of range land and 26 acres of range 
land located in West Canyon, Utah County, Utah. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 3 
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Civil No-: 900000252DA 
(c) Lots 3 and 4 being part of 11.5 acres of land 
located at approximately 1100 South 850 West in 
Tremonton, Utah, including 4.96 hours of irrigation 
water. 
(d) The equity in the family home at 911 North 
Tremont located in Tremonton, Utah, which has an equity 
of $14,500.00, and the Plaintiff shall sell said home 
without any commission and shall bring all mortgage 
payments current to the date of sale, provided however 
Defendant shall vacate the home within thirty (30) days 
after the divorce is granted. That if the family home 
does not bring a net of $14,500.00 equity for the 
Defendant, the Plaintiff shall reimburse the Defendant 
from his own personal assets all sums up to $14,500.00 so 
that the Defendant shall receive a net equity of 
$14,500.00. 
(e) Five lots in Lot 1 Block 12, Lehi Cemetery. 
5. That Plaintiff shall assume the Nadine Peters' 
note of $26,000.00 for the 9 1/2 acres, with 9.54 hours 
of water, which is part of the 11.5 acres of land set 
forth in item (c) hereinabove. 
6. That the Plaintiff shall convey and do whatever 
is legally proper and necessary to convey to the 
Defendant all other items of real and personal property 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 4 
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as listed on the family Trust Agreement and all other 
items presently owned by the trust by and between the two 
(2) beneficiaries, Don B. Southwick and Barbara P. 
Southwick, designated as Plaintiff and Defendant 
respectively herein. That the Plaintiff shall further 
convey to the Defendant all items of real and personal 
property, except as to those items he shall retain that 
is not included in the trust and all items of real and 
property included in the trust to the Defendant as her 
sole and separate property, 
7. That the Plaintiff shall receive as his sole and 
separate property all of his clothes, small personal 
items, such as toiletries, etc., and that the Plaintiff 
is also awarded the 1980 Luv pickup truck as his sole and 
separate property. 
8. That the Plaintiff shall manage and take care of 
the business building until the bank makes a decision as 
to the disposition and said agreement is finalized and 
further shall defend any lawsuit sought by the bank for 
the foreclosure on said property. That the Plaintiff 
shall be entitled to receive the rental income during the 
interim and shall also manage said business building 
until that matter is disposed of, either by foreclosure 
or sale, and the Plaintiff shall divide the rental income 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 5 
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SOUTHWICK VS. SOUTHWICK 
Civil No.: 900000252DA 
from the building equally between Plaintiff and 
Defendant, minus the reasonable expenses necessary in 
maintaining the building, which the Plaintiff shall 
furnish the Defendant a full accounting of, 
9. That the Plaintiff shall further pay to the 
Defendant the sum of $145.00 per month as and for 
alimony, payable each month on or before the 15th day of 
the month, commencing with the month of October. That in 
addition, shall pay to the Defendant a proportionate 
increase of his social security benefits as additional 
alimony as he receives any additional payments in his 
social security, and that the intent is to attempt to 
equalize the income the parties are receiving for marital 
assets, provided however the alimony shall terminate upon 
the death of the Defendant or the Defendant's remarriage. 
10. That the Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant's 
attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, the sum of $500.00 as and for 
partial attorney fees for the preparation of the 
Stipulation, plus presenting the matter to the Court and 
preparing the subsequent papers granting to the parties 
the divorce. 
11. That the Defendant further shall bring current 
and pay the property taxes on the 11.5 acres of land 
located in Tremonton and on the land located in Utah 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 6 
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County, said taxes shall be for the years 1990 and 1991* 
12- That the Plaintiff shall further provide to the 
Defendant the necessary cash at the execution of the 
Stipulation, to bring current the delinquent house 
payments on the family home, which is located at 911 
North Tremont in Tremonton, Utah. 
13. That the Defendant shall utilize the trust 
properties to attempt to satisfy any deficiency that 
might arise from the business building, which is 
presently being foreclosed upon, if the trust properties 
are still in existence at the time of the final judgment 
and shall utilize said assets if they are in existence 
and if the Defendant has control over said trust 
properties to attempt to satisfy any deficiency on the 
pending foreclosure, provided however that if she does 
not have any control over the assets in the trust, then 
she would not be obligated to satisfy said foreclosure 
judgment if one does occur. 
14. That each of the parties shall sign whatever 
papers are legally necessary to effectively transfer the 
interest that each is to receive in connection with this 
agreement and upon failure to do so, the Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement shall serve as the full 
agreement between the parties and shall serve as an 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 7 
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effective and complete transfer of all assets that each 
party is to receive under the terms of the Stipulation 
and Property Settlement Agreement. 
15. That the Defendant shall assume and discharge 
all other attorney fees she owes to her attorney, other 
than the amount that the Plaintiff is contributing 
herein. 
16. That Plaintiff shall assume and discharge his 
own attorney fees and costs. 
DATED this 
, / NOV , 
y day of October, 1991, 
F. L. GUNNELL, 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Decree of Divorce was posted in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid and addressed to Don 
B. Southwick, Plaintiff, at 6th North 100 West, 
Tremonton, Utah 84337 on this P" day of October, 
1991. 
^ (.rm, I 
Secretary 
M. (sm 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
"' -" • 1-L.J.-K 
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October 7, 1991 
Mr. Phillip D. Southwick 
1050 South 660 West 
Tremonton, UT 84337 
Re: Southwick vs. Southwick 
My File: 400-V 
Comes now the undersigned, Don B. Southwick and Barbara P. 
Southwick, beneficiaries under that Trust Agreement dated 
September 13, 1989 and which was signed in Tremonton, Utah, and 
hereby direct said Trustee to convey and transfer all of the assets 
located in said trust to Barbara P. Southwick as the sole 
beneficiary under the terms of said Trust Agreement, 
That the undersigned, Don B. Southwick and Barbara P. 
Southwick, direct the Trustee to do whatever is legally necessary 
to remove Don B. Southwick as a beneficiary under the terms of that 
Trust Agreement and to designate Barbara P. Southwick as the sole 
beneficiary under the terms of the Trust Agreement hereinabove 
designated. 
That both parties acknowledge they have a copy of the Trust 
Agreement and that the direction being made to the Trustee is based 
on the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement entered into 
by and between Don B. Southwick as Plaintiff and Barbara P. 
Southwick as Defendant in a pending divorce action, located in the 
First Judicial District Court of Box Elder County, State of Utah, 
bearing civil number 900000252DA. 
That this letter is signed by both beneficiaries and directed 
to the Trustee pursuant to their rights under the Trust Agreement. 
DATED this \ \ day of October, 1991. 
DON" B. SOUTHWICK, ^ 
Plaintiff & Beneficiary 
3ARA P. SOUTHWICK, 
Defendant & Beneficiary 
U*X£I»<JJL 
TabD 
January 24, 1992 
Mr. Phillip D. Southwick 
1050 South 660 West 
Tremonton, UT 84337 
Re: Don B. Southwick and Barbara P. Southwick Trust 
Dear Mr. Southwick: 
Comes now the undersigned, TRACY L. SOUTHWICK, beneficiary under 
that Trust Agreement dated September 13, 1989 which was signed in 
Tremonton, Utah, and hereby renounces any claim he may have to 
any of the Trust Estate including income and/or principal, all 
cash including bank accounts, and all proceeds from life 
insurance policies and further directs said Trustee to distribute 
his share of the Trust Estate to PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK. 
DATED this 3 ( day of January, 1992. 
tf: ^UTHWICK 
.ciary 
Approved and Accepted by the undersigned as Trustee this 
day of JVU^A_, 1992. 
PHILL^ D. SOUTHWICK 
Trustee 
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